This paper investigates the question of which place in the history of political ideas may be assigned to the Constitutional Debate in Herodotus' Histories, 3.80-82. It is shown that the Herodotean debate represents the earliest extant example of a social theory, in which a variety of distinctly social ordering principles are weighed against each other with normative arguments and in isolation from all sorts of divine authorisations. The article divides into three parts. The first part gives an account of the theoretical predecessors to the classical social theory first evidenced in the Constitutional Debate. The second part consists of an exposition of the socio-intellectual progressions clustered in the Herodotean debate, focussing on developments in constitutional thinking and argumentative evolvement. The third part consists of a close reading of the argumentative and politico-social content of the Constitutional Debate.
The Constitutional Debate of Book III in Herodotus' Histories is a dispute set at Susa in and around 522 B.C.E. The debate involves three noble Persians, who, after having lead a successful coup against the 'false Smerdis' -i.e., against the ὅμοιος εἶδος Σμέρδι ("the one looking like Smerdis"), posing as the brother of the deceased king Cambyses -consider whether to change the constitution in one of two ways, or to leave the political order unaltered. 1 The three Persian aristocrats involved in the debate are Otanes pleading the case for democracy, Megabyzus for oligarchy and the future king Darius for the prevailing form of rule -namely, monarchy. 2 In the Herodotean narrative, the debate has been placed strikingly at the centre of the account of the history of Persia in its phase of transition from the reign of Cambyses to that of Darius and the ensuing Persian Wars.
The Constitutional Debate has thus naturally become one of the most famous and most written about separate tales (λόγοι) retold by Herodotus. 3 Given that much earlier scholarship has engaged with the possible connections between the Herodotean debate and contemporary sophistic theory, 4 it should be mentioned at the outset that the question of allegiance to the sophists is almost completely bypassed in this article. Instead, the aim here is to map the hitherto neglected terrain of the evidence provided by the Constitutional Debate regarding questions of progressions in political thought and in social theory, 5 as well as to shed some light on the origins of the kind of normative arguments ('internal critique') reflected in the argumentation employed by the different sides in the debate. 6 To begin by overviewing the constitutional alternatives weighed against each other in the Constitutional Debate, one may note that this very juxtaposition -in spite of the Persian 6th century setting -quite accurately reflects the political oppositions obtaining within the Greek cultural sphere towards the middle of the 5th century B.C.E. 7 By this time, the internal division of the Greek city-states was on the verge of turning into that strife between proponents of rule by the full body of enfranchised people (δημοκρατία) and re-narrowed elite rule (ὀλιγαρχία), which by the end of the century had become the ordinary state of af-3 Cf. Lateiner, "The Constitutional Debate", 210: "The Constitutional Debate creates a benchmark, shapes expectations for the three theoretical forms of government in action…". 4 The case in point would be the struggle to establish a connection between the Constitutional Debate and the authorship of Protagoras. Ernst Maass was the first to claim Protagoras as the original author of the debate. Maass, "Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der griechischen Prosa", 581-595. When aiming to prove Maass' hypothesis some ninety years later, François Lasserre had to admit, however, that "La preuve, évidemment, n'existe pas, sinon il y a longtemps qu'on l'aurait apportée". Lasserre, "Le débat sur les constitutions", 81. 5 The theoretical outlook of this article distinguishes between progression and progress. The aim here is not to defend an outworn and racist conception à la Wilhelm Nestle that would re-establish the Greeks -"aus der Unmündigkeit zur Mündigkeit des Geistes" -as the preeminent forerunners in the "rise of reason" as such. I believe in no such cultural superiority. Cultures evolve over time, but their inner developments are intimately intertwined with and shaped by those of other cultures -of whom they have borrowed and with whom they continuously interact. For a defence of the view of cross-cultural interaction as the vehicle of world-historical breakthroughs, see Bentley, The term 'internal critique' has been coined by Johan Tralau and refers to normative arguments aiming to refute by showing how the simultaneous holding of some normative principles and views leads to inconsistencies in terms which the criticized subjects themselves can agree to. See e.g. Tralau, Johan "Der Ursprung der Politischen Philosophie", 27-51. 7 Another cluster of much-discussed questions largely bypassed in this article relates to the oddity pertaining to the Constitutional Debate's combination of a Persian setting with a Greek socio-political content. For an overview of the discussion surrounding these questions, see Asheri, A Commentary on [472] [473] fairs. 8 In the Constitutional Debate, however, this ensuing conflict is still principally overshadowed by the reminiscence of an original clash between rule of one (μοναρχία or τυραννίς) and broadened elite rule (ἰσονομία). 9 Can we assume, then, that the original political opposition between one man's rule and broadened elite rule had its counterpart in an original social theory dealing with this conflict?
The first part of this paper strives to answer the above question, thereby addressing the broader query of the nature of social theorising encountered in the Greek archaic sources. More specifically, the following section enquires to what extent the archaic Greek literary sources -i.e., epic and lyric poetry as well as pre-Socratic philosophy -may already be understood to give evidence of a social theory postulating actual alternatives to the prevailing form of social rule. 10 In the second part of the article, the argumentative development leading up to the increased application of internally critical arguments within the Greek cultural sphere is overviewed. Finally, the last-third of the article engages with a reading of the Constitutional Debate, focussing specifically on its argumentative and socio-political content. Here, it is shown that the Herodotean debate contains the earliest evidence of the combination of arguments of an internally critical kind with constitutionalised political thought -i.e., the notion of constitutional alternatives as humanly realizable entities. 8 Cf. Simonton, Classical Greek Oligarchy: A Political History, [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] [34] In her work on ancient Greek tyranny, Sian Lewis identified the original meaning of τυραννίς as being distinct from μοναρχία in that the former careried with it the idea of absolute and personal power not bound by constitutional laws. However, as Lewis also noted, the definition of tyranny as one man's rule without legal restraint derives from Aristotle (Pol. 1295a 19-23) -i.e., from the late classical age. There is no evidence from the Greek archaic age of tyranny and monarchy being distinguished from each other as distinct constitutional forms. Only towards the end of the archaic age do we encounter evidence of the general idea of one man's rule (μοναρχία) being opposed against a likewise general idea of 'like order' , or 'equal division' of social power, (ἰσονομία). Lewis, Greek Tyranny, 2 & 10. Cf. Alcmaeon of Croton, B4 (DK). 9 Ehrenberg, "Origins of Democracy", 525-526. 10 The concept of social rule and social power assumed in this article builds on the social theory of pre-modern societies as developed by Anthony Giddens. According to this theory, the social rulers would be identical with the persons or groups on the top of the hierarchies determining the relations of autonomy and dependence obtaining "between actors or collectivities in contexts of social interaction". However, such social dominance can of course never be absolute, since "all forms of dependence offer some resources whereby those who are subordinate can influence the activities of their superiors". Giddens, The Constitution of Society, 16.
I: Predecessors to classical social theory

Epic and lyric poetry
In the Homeric and Hesiodic epics, we encounter the earliest evidence of a thorough questioning of specified social rulers -namely, of the chieftains or local kings in charge of judicial and religious matters in the early archaic age's small-state communities: the βασιλεῖς. In Hesiod's Works and Days we read of the βασιλῆς δωροφάγοι ("gift-devouring kings") -whom Hesiod advises to keep steadfastly away from crooked judgments. 11 The Hesiodic judgment is echoed in more descriptive terms in the Odyssey, where it is assumed that "to do beyond what is ordained […] that is the right of godly kings. 12 In Greek lyric poetry, we likewise find examples of severe devaluations of particular political power-holders, especially of the rule of τύραννοι. 13 As of yet, however, the divinely sanctioned right regarding the holding of political privileges of the socially and economically dominant parties seems not to have been put into question. 14 The absence in early Greek epic and lyric poetry of a questioning of the overarching principle of elite rule is confirmed in the narrative of the Iliad, although the idea of a sole ruler ruling with singular authority is certainly not embraced here either. In fact, the first half of the Iliad may be interpreted as a gradually enfolding undermining of the legitimacy of monarchic authority. 15 The subversion of the principle of sole rule is brought to completion in a pair of speeches ascribed to the character of Diomedes. In Book IX, Diomedes first steps up to challenge the authority of Agamemnon. This Diomedes does by claiming that Agamemnon may have been given the kingly sceptre, but that he lacks the θύμος ("spirit") to go with it (9.29-39). 16 In Book XIV, Diomedes then finally manages to disqualify 11 Hes., WD, 263-264. 12 Homer, Od., 4.690-691. 13 The earliest example of devaluation of tyrannical rule is found in Archilochus, fr. 19 (West). 14 For an account according to which the social elite was first stripped of its "guardianship over the constitution" (φυλακὴ τῆς πολιτείας) at Athens in 462 B.C.E., see (Pseudo-)Arist., Ath. Pol., 25.2. 15 See Hammer, "'Who Shall Readily Obey'", 4-12. Cf. Barker, Entering the Agon, 22, 51. The kingly rule practiced among the Achaeans by Agamemnon is actually put into question by Achilles already in Book I of the Iliad (most obtrusively at 1.292-296). However, Book II still unequivocally assumes godly sanction for the general principle of sole rule as such (2.204-207) . εἷς κοίρανος ἔστω, εἷς βασιλεύς, ᾧ δῶκε Κρόνου πάϊς […] σκῆπτρόν ("let there be one commander, one king, to whom Zeus gave the kingly sceptre"). 16 Elsewhere in the Iliad, Agamemnon is in fact presented as a kind of "sacred king" -i.e., as a ruler whose social authority derives directly from the intimate connection between his person and the divine sphere. Thus Agamemnon is pictured by means of the accusativus respectus as being ὄμματα καὶ κεφαλὴν ἴκελος Διὶ ("like the judgment of ὄρχαμος λαῶν ("the leader of the people"), Agamemnon, . Hence, the middle part of the Iliad can be seen to evidence a serious undermining of Agamemnon's monopolisation of high command, which in the beginning of the narrative had still been given a divine authorisation (at 2.480-483, with reference to the will of Zeus). By extension, the narrative may be understood to proceed towards a questioning of the very principle of sole rule as such, since no longer is it taken for granted that the war policy should be decided by a single leader in possession of the best judgments.
However, what we do not find evidenced in the Iliad -or anywhere else in archaic epic and lyric poetry -is a deviation from the notion that only members of the social elite may be entitled to rule. On the contrary, whenever monarchic authority is questioned in the narrative of the Iliad, this contending takes place against the background of the assumption that the rule should be broadened, but only narrowly. Consequently, Diomedes claims his right to oppose Agamemnon by pointing out that his own patrilineal descent and divine ancestors are comparable to those of Agamemnon. 17 But when in contrast in Book II, the ignoble Thersites ἀμετροεπής ("with the unfitting speech") had tried to raise his voice against Agamemnon's, he was first violently reproached for daring to speak up against a βασιλεύς, and subsequently even beaten to tears by the staff of Odysseys. 18 In truth, the closest we get to an admitting of an actual social alternative in archaic Greek poetry is the Iliad's undermining of monarchic authority. This subversion, as we have seen, takes the form of a retrospective authorisation: the circumvention of the social rule of the βασιλεῖς and the concomitant broadening of the elite rule. But how is it with the political thought attested in the rest of archaic literature? Could the fragmentarily preserved works of the pre-Socratic philosophers be understood to evidence an awareness of a variety of social ordering principles?
Zeus with regard to his eyes and head"), and it is claimed that Ζεὺς himself θῆκε ("placed") Agamemnon ἔξοχον ἡρώεσσιν ("above the rest of the heroes"). Homer, Il. 2.474-483. 17 πατρὸς δ᾽ ἐξ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ ἐγὼ γένος εὔχομαι εἶναι/Τυδέος, ὃν Θήβῃσι χυτὴ κατὰ γαῖα καλύπτει. ("I also claim to be of the lineage of a noble father, of Tydeus, whom in Thebe underneath a mound the earth covers"). Homer, Homer, Il. 2.212ff.
Pre-Socratics
Among the pre-Socratics, we do find the earliest examples of theories in which different ruling principles are weighed against others, and where varying personalised as well as impersonal divine forces are conceived as regulating both the human and the cosmic order. 19 In what remains of the writings of Alcmaeon of Croton, we find the earliest explicit opposing of varying impersonal principles of cosmic rule: τῆς μὲν ὑγείας εἶναι συνεκτικὴν τὴν ἰσονομίαν τῶν δυνάμεων, ὑγροῦ, ξηροῦ, ψυχροῦ, θερμοῦ, πικροῦ, γλυκέος καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν, τὴν δ᾽ ἐν αὐτοῖς μοναρχίαν νόσου ποιητικήν· φθοροποιὸν γὰρ ἑκατέρου μοναρχίαν. 20
Fitting for keeping health in place is like order of forces, of moisture, dryness, cold, heat, bitter, sweet and the rest, whereas monarchy among these is the maker of decease: the monarchy of any of these is the cause of destruction.
The juxtaposing of 'like order' and monarchy evidenced in the passage above takes place in a context dealing specifically with questions of health and illness. Political undertones may nevertheless be hunched in the clash of principles pictured in the Alcmaeonian fragment. 21 However, although the ruling principles are here no longer conceived of as personalised divine forces -but rather as akin to something like impersonal, or trans-individual, ordering foundations -they still bear evidence of a comprehensive intertwining of the human sphere with powers determining the cosmic order. 22 Consequently, it is impossible to conceive of the principles juxtaposed in the above fragment -μοναρχία versus ἰσονομία -as varying social ordering principles in their own right. 23
19 See e.g. Heraclit., fr. B 53 (DK), Parm. fr. B 9 (DK) and Anaximand. B 1 (DK). 20 Alcmaeon of Croton, B4 (DK). 21 Triebel-Schubert, "Der Begriff der Isonomie bei Alkmaion", 41-42. Cf. Brock, Roger, Greek Political Imagery from Homer to Aristotle, [69] [70] [71] [72] [73] [74] [75] [76] [77] [78] [79] [80] [81] [82] Cf. Seaford, Cosmology and the Polis, 3 and 55. 23 In general, the pre-Socratics' theories surrounding principles regulating the world order reveal a deep connecction with varying "cosmically naturalising" forms of thought -or with ways of thinking within which the social ordering principles are naturalised and projected onto the divine sphere. Consequently, Aristotle characterized Anaximander' s and other early Greek philosophers' investigations as a search for first principles (ἀρχαί), equated with the divine sphere (τὸ θεῖον) and taken to "regulate everything" (πάντα κυβερνᾶν). See Arist., Phys. 4.203b.
Conclusion
What the examples of social theorising evidenced in the pre-Socratic fragments and in archaic epic and lyric poetry have in common is the absence of a questioning of the overriding principle of divinely sanctioned elite rule -i.e., of the reassurance, projected onto the cosmic plane, of the natural political dominance of the socially privileged parties. Although in the archaic literary sources various factual rulers may be severely criticised for having failed to live up to the ideal rule, and different ruling principles may be weighed against each other as well, the pre-classical sources bear no evidence of a social theory recognising an explicit alternative to the overarching principle of divinely sanctioned elite rule. Indeed, what seems to have been lacking completely in the Greek societies of the archaic age was an acknowledgment of a range of humanly realisable constitutional alternatives.
In order to find a social theory where different social orders are clearly distinguished from each other, we thus have to look further ahead in time. With regard to such theories, the Constitutional Debate (470-430 B.C.E.) in book III of Herodotus Histories in fact provides the earliest evidence. 24 Here, we also encounter the earliest example of social theorising recognising an alternative to the overarching principle of elite rule -namely, of an admitting of people's rule (πλῆθος ἄρχον) as a realisable alternative for the ordering of society. 25 Moreover, the constitutional alternatives are here weighed against each other with normative arguments for the first time. But what enabled the juxtaposing and theorising of different principles of social rule?
II: Preconditions for classical social theory
In truth, a high number of necessary conditions for what G. E. R. Lloyd called "certain kinds of inquiry in philosophy and science, and the attack on certain traditional assumptions" may be enumerated -and all of these same criteria may also be assumed to have been necessary for social theory to develop. Some of these preconditions the ancient Greek world shared with neighbouring cultures in the Near East and Egypt -such as relative urbanisation and wealth, height-ened trade and colonisation and a concomitant knowledge of differing cultures and customs, as well as a literacy not exclusively the prerogative of a scribal elite. Others, such as a range of societies forming small independent political entities and a developing consciousness of law and constitutional matters were more specific for the Greek-speaking world -at least when compared to neighbouring cultural spheres. 26 What I aim at in this article, however, is an explanatory model seeking to gain a view of what could be called an enabling sine qua non -i.e., that which worked on top of the other prerequisites and effectively gave birth to the phenomenon under investigation. The hypothesis proposed here singles out two distinct socio-intellectual tendencies forming decisive sequences in the progression of moral and political thinking towards social theory proper:
1.
general argumentative development, crystallised in the enhanced application of normative critique in connection with moral and political thought. 2.
constitutionalisation of political thinking, making possible the grasping and confronting of a range of mutually exclusive social orders, or distinct social ordering principles.
In the following, these socio-intellectual tendencies will be further expounded on, beginning with the constitutionalisation of political thought.
Constitutionalisation
As shown above, throughout the archaic age of Greece, the lack of an alternative to the overarching principle of elite rule had found its counterpart in an absence of clearly conceptualised constitutional alternatives. In place of positing such alternatives -and aiming to guide the choosing between them -pre-classical Greek political thought seems typically to have been set on preconceived ideas of a right order. 27 The notions relating to how best to realise the right order was then given expression to with concepts such as εὐνομία, or -later, with the broadening of the elite rulewith ἰσονομία. 28 However, with the beginning of the classical age, a popular political 26 Lloyd, Magic, Reason and Experience, [234] [235] [236] [237] [238] [239] [240] [241] [242] [243] [244] [245] [246] Cf. Meier, The Greek Discovery of Politics, [164] [165] The first occurrence of εὐνομία is in Homer: Od. 17.487. The noun and adjective forms of the concept probably derive from the verbal stem -vεμ-(to distribute or to assign) and not from νόμος, as the latter is not attested thought relying on the idea of a good order seems to have been gradually replaced with a political thinking centred on the question 'Who should rule?' . 29 As we have seen, however, already some of the earliest preserved literature from the archaic age of Greece contains evidence of a thorough questioning of factual social rulers -namely, of the βασιλεῖς. 30 The quarrel relating to the question which men -or which type of men -should rule the community may thus hardly be taken to have arisen first in the Greek classical age. Rather, the central political controversies of the classical age must be conceived of as having been carried on from earlier ages, since all social systems must always contain an element of "dialectics of control". 31 Indeed, in the archaic age of Greece -as elsewhere in the ancient world -it was probably just the ultimate legitimation of the prevailing order, which was generally conceived of as deriving its legitimation from a sphere beyond the human. 32 By means of such an effective authorisation, however, any more revolutionary alteration of the social status quo could certainly have been prevented: τρέφονται γὰρ πάντες οἱ ἀνθρώπειοι νόμοι ὑπὸ ἑνὸς τοῦ θείου. 33 All laws of men are nourished by one of god.
With the beginning of the Greek classical age, something radically new may nevertheless have seen the light of day in the political thinking of (some) human in Homer. In its intimate connection with (godly sanctioned) good order and tending to laws (written or unwritten), ἐυνομία finds it first use in Solon. See esp. Sol. fr. 38-26) 4) (West). (For a defence of the authenticity of the elegies ascribed to Solon, see Lardinois, "Have We Solon's Verses?", 17-28). The earliest extant evidence of the adjective-form of ἰσονομία is found in the drinking song in honour of "the tyrannicides" Harmodius and Aristogeiton. See "scolia anonyma" (Diehl), 13. As for the noun-form of ἰσονομία, here a traditional "constitutional" model of "good order" (εὐνομία), is adjusted with a criterion of (some notion of ) equality, thus establishing a link between equality and justice. This may be taken as a terminological indication of a new type of participation by the demos in the functioning of institutions and of a more widespread conception of equality before the law. Cf. Raaflaub societies. As far as we know, it was here -namely, in the newly established direct democracies -that different constitutional orders first began to be conceived of as abstract, transferrable and, in a heightened sense, arbitrary. 34 This would entail the first arising of the awareness that there are fundamentally different, and mutually exclusive, constitutional alternatives -and that these are essentially manmade and nothing beyond that.
In truth, the emergence of a social theory admitting of fundamental alternatives to the prevailing order presupposes the possibility to put into question the very principle of social rule to be followed in and by the society at large. Consequently, the kind of theorising within which humanly applicable real-world alternatives were admitted, could not ensue before in the actual ordering of society the overarching principle of elite rule had been sidestepped. It was with the creation of the first full-scale direct democracies -i.e., with the breakthrough of δημοκρατία -that the turnover in the principle of rule and the concomitant opposing of fundamentally different constitutional alternatives -of people's rule with ὀλιγαρχία and μοναρχία -first transpired.
However, what finally -at some point in the beginning of the Greek classical age -35 effected the inauguration of a distinctly social theory seems to have been the conjoining of the constitutionalisation of political thinking with another decisive socio-intellectual tendency: general argumentative development crystallised in the rise of a specific type of normative critique. In what follows, an outline of the development leading up to the enhanced application of this type of normative critique within the Greek cultural sphere will be embarked upon. 34 Cf. Bleicken, "Zur Entstehung der Verfassungstypologie", [383] [384] The question of when and where the breakthrough of δημοκρατία first took place is debated. At the moment of writing, the dominant scholarly view holds that full-scale direct democracy emerged originally at Athens in 508 B.C.E. as a consequence of the reforms ascribed to Cleisthenes. Cf. Cartledge, Ancient Greek Political Thought in Practice, 57-62. However, an alternative viewpoint underlines the importance of the elite-disempowering reforms in 462 B.C.E ascribed to Ephialtes for the effectuation of direct democracy at Athens. Cf. Rihll, "Democracy Denied: Why Ephialtes attacked the Areopagus", 96-97. As an alternative to both of these views, Eric Robinson has placed the earliest realisation of people's rule at Argos in the 490's B.C.E. See Robinson, Democracy Beyond Athens, [196] [197] 
Internal critique
In fact, it does not take much of a historian to notice that the 5th century B.C.E. in Greece was not only a time of political upheaval, but also of general increase in the argumentative capabilities of the inhabitants of the Greek societies. These processes are often thought of as having worked together in tandem: if democracy is direct, then anything should be possible to put directly into question, and so persuasive argumentation was bound to grow more important in city-states affected by democratisation. 36 The inference in question may rest on a somewhat exaggerated view of ancient democratic freedom, but it is true that Herodotus does not record any restrictions concerning the Greek citizens' freedom to think and speak freely (παρρησία/ἰσηγορία). 37 This only holds true, though, for the sections where his story is on democracies, and where the citizens' "freedom to speak" is backed up by democratic institutions -whereas the Histories seem to imply that the exact opposite may have been the case, e.g., in ancient Persia. 38 All the same, with regard to the political institutions in the democracies of Ancient Greece, Herodotus actually stresses the power of persuasive argument as he notices how easily the assemblies may be "deceived" (διαβάλλειν). 39 However, the persuasive turn in the governing bodies and within judicial litigation may have been preceded, or at least seriously spurred on, by what Lloyd referred to as the evolvement of "reasoned argument to a main line of inquiry" in Greek philosophy. This could have been the order of appearance, at least if we admit that it was the indirect proofs, or reductive arguments -i.e., arguments moving deductively from the assumption of the inconsequence of the contrary case -of the 6th century Greek philosophers that set in motion the more technical argumentative development within judicial litigation as well. 40 A closer look at a fragment belonging to one pre-Socratic thinker allows for a view of how their 36 See e.g. Netz, The Shaping of Deduction in Greek Mathematics, 292. 37 Like modern political freedoms, the ancient counterpart to freedom of speech, παρρησία alternatively ἰσηγορία, must always have had its limits. At certain times, these limits may have been circumscribed more restrictively. Thus "freedom of speech" may even have vanished completely, since παρρησία is likely to have worked more like a citizen attribute than a negative right in any modern sense. When centred on normative judgments, indirectly refuting arguments form a subdivision of a more general kind of critical argumentation. These kinds of arguments could be labelled 'internal critique' . A basic definition of internally critical arguments -in which their connection to reductive argumentation is made evident -is as follows:
Internal critique consists of arguments designed to refute statements by means of drawing out the conclusion of the statements, as well as by showing that these consequences lead to logical inconsistencies. Moreover, since it is an argu-41 Implicit reductive arguments, although not very strict ones, may be found already in Homer: In fact, implicit reductive arguments of the modus tollens type (A, because if not A then B, but not B, therefore A) abound in early Greek literature. See e.g. Heraclit. B 40, 91, 110 and 127 and Xenophan. B 11, 14, [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] . 42 For an attempt at tracing the origins of modus tollens back to the so-called chiasma-type of epic narrative structure, present already in early Mesopotamian epic poetry, see Doxiadis, "Narrative, Rhetoric, and the Origins of Logics", 77-99. mentative technique of normative theory -i.e., of theory dealing with value-laden questions concerning the ideal norms for society, laws and morals -internal critique takes as its object some normative principle or view.
As educated persons usually note, this argumentative technique is a typical trait in the works of Plato. 43 In fact, these kinds of arguments have featured in normative theory ever since, and normative theories generally employ several different forms of internal critique. 44 For illuminating how already in pre-Platonic Greece internal critique was in use in argumentation with politico-ethical content, I have singled out a passage from Book III in the Histories of Herodotus retelling a discussion between the Samian tyrant Maeandrius and his imprisoned brother Charilaus. The background to the reproach depicted in the passage is Maeandrius' willingness to surrender Samos without resistance to the invading Persians: ἐμὲ μέν, ὦ κάκιστε ἀνδρῶν, ἐόντα σεωυτοῦ ἀδελφεὸν καὶ ἀδικήσαντα οὐδὲν ἄξιον δεσμοῦ δήσας γοργύρης ἠξίωσας, ὁρέων δὲ τοὺς Πέρσας ἐκβάλλοντάς τέ σε καὶ ἄνοικον ποιέοντας οὐ τολμᾷς τίσασθαι, οὕτω δή τι ἐόντας εὐπετέας χειρωθῆναι· 45
In the passage above, Charilaus scrutinises his tyrant brother's reasoning in face of the Persian threat, using in this connection what may be identified as internal critique in the form of an uncovering of an inconsistency between an implicit normative principle and an explicit normative view. The principle in question pertains to Maeandrius' approval of physical force, taken to be instantiated in the enforced act of imprisonment Charilaus has faced at the hands of his brother: "me, you worst of men, although I am your own brother and I have committed no crime 43 For a particularly refined example of Platonic internal critique, see Here, Socrates shows that the moral principle held by Thrasymachus -according to which justice equals τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος συμφέρον ("the interest of the stronger") -stands in opposition to the very idea of ruling as it had been conceived of by the participants earlier in the debate, where ruling was defined as τέχνη ("form of art") handled with regard to the needs of the ruled rather than the ruler. 44 Cf. Tralau, Inbjudan till politisk teori, 37-63. 45 Hdt. 3.139.2. worthy of imprisonment, you deem worthy of being cast in a dungeon." The explicit normative view, in its turn, may be traced to Maeandrius' unwillingness to take up arms against the Persians: "all the while you watch the Persians throw you out of your own country and make you homeless, but you do not dare to pay them back even though they are so easily subdued." How can Maeandrius keep his own brother in prison, without him even having done any harm, while remaining passive in relation to the Persians -despite of the fact that the latter threaten to throw Maeandrius out of his own country? This, in essence, is the internal critique Charilaus applies against his brother: the no-good heir to the tyranny of Polycrates. Now, due to the meagre amount of preserved literary sources from the late archaic age, it is impossible to determine when internal critique first originated within the ancient Greek cultural sphere. The preserved archaic Greek literature -in contrast to the abundance of indirectly refuting arguments without normative content -shows no evidence of clearly recognisable internal critique. Perhaps, though, some fragments containing indirectly refuting argument ascribed by Aristotle to the 6th-century lyric poets Sappho and Alcaeus could -if they are genuine -be counted as exceptions. 46 All the same, the abundance of Herodotean as well as other early classical evidence of argumentation that can be recast as different types of internal critique suggests that these kinds of arguments became an ever-more important part of moral and political thought after the emergence of full-scale direct democracies. 47 It could well be, then, that the breakthrough of δημοκρατία had resulted in the creation of a sphere of radical politico-moral equality within in-groups of fully enfranchised citizens. 48 This realised in-group equality ensured that subjects belonging to these groups were not only liable to be judged on account of some shared moral conception -e.g., regarding their inability to live up to the ideal conduct of someone in their position -but in fact directly accountable 46 Indeed, something resembling normative arguments of an internally critical kind may be detected in a fragment ascribed to Sappho by Aristotle: Rhet., 1367a11-14. However, here the Sapphic critique does not take as its object some distinct moral principle or view in order to refute the statements of the person (Alcaeus) adhering to them. Rather, the argument calls into question the way Alcaeus reasons surrounding the subject matter of his poetry -i.e., his poetic-ethic outlook. For a similar example of a refuting argument of the modus tollens type ascribed to Sappho by Aristotle, see Rhet. 1398b29-30. 47 In extant Greek literature, the earliest clear-cut example of normative critique of an internally critical kind is found in Aeschylus' Oresteia. See Aesch. Eum. 607-643. Here the politico-moral outlook of Apollo is shown to be inconsistent as a consequence of him defending a principle of paternal partiality with reference to Zeus -the latter having been the first to break this principle by murdering his own father. Clearly recognisable examples of internal critique may be detected throughout the Herodotean corpus. See e.g. Hdt. 4.137, 7.9 and 9.122. 48 Cf. Morris, "The Strong Principle of Equality", with regard to the same moral principles and views. Therewith, the preconditions for the operation of internal critique had first been fulfilled.
Historical hypothesis
Concerning the development of political thinking towards social theory within the ancient Greek cultural sphere, the hypothesis proposed in this article is of double nature. On the one hand, it postulates a fulfilled constitutionalisation of political thinking leading to alternative humanly applicable orders -or fundamentally different principles for ordering the rule of society -becoming for the first time opposed. On the other hand, it assumes that the moral and political thinking surrounding these alternative principles for social rule launched by means of normative critique of an internally critical kind.
The next mission is to establish that internal critique and constitutionalised political thinking indeed merged in the Constitutional Debate. Accomplishing this task requires separating oneself from the sphere of theoretical constructions and begin overviewing the actual arguments contained in the Herodotean debate.
III: The Constitutional Debate and the beginnings of classical social theory
The Persian grandee instigating the Constitutional Debate is Otanes, who pleads for democracy.
Otanes for democracy
ἡμέων μούναρχον μηκέτι γενέσθαι. (3.80.2). from us a king shall never come. μόναρχος, with its literal meaning of 'sole ruler' , may be the earliest of the three constitutional terms under discussion in the debate. 49 As such, it is also the first conglomerate term in which the first part refers to the subject instead of the object of government. Its use here in isolation from all forms of divine legitimations -i.e., as a principle of social rule in its own right to be judged over against other humanly realisable principles: ὀλιγαρχία and πλῆθος ἄρχον -gives an indication of the fulfilled constitutionalisation of political thinking. Otanes' first argument against monarchy boils down to a simple reminder, based on the shared experience of a recent past: "you have seen and been part of the insolence of our past two rulers". καὶ γὰρ ἂν τὸν ἄριστον ἀνδρῶν πάντων […] ἐγγίνεται μὲν γάρ οἱ ὕβρις ὑπὸ τῶν παρεόντων ἀγαθῶν, φθόνος δὲ ἀρχῆθεν ἐμφύεται ἀνθρώπῳ. (3.80.3). even if he (the sole ruler) were the best man of all […] in him would come insolence from the goods in his surroundings, and malice has grown into man from the beginning.
In order to cover also the hypothetical situation of the rule of the best man, the preceding argument based on the experience of past factual rulers is generalised. Whenever there is one man's rule, whether he would be the best or the worst of men, malice and insolence will follow him in his rule -and therefore bad government. ἀναρμοστότατον δὲ πάντων· ἤν τε γὰρ αὐτὸν μετρίως θωμάζῃς, ἄχθεται ὅτι οὐ κάρτα θεραπεύεται, ἤν τε θεραπεύῃ τις κάρτα, ἄχθεται ἅτε θωπί. (3.80.5).
What is least fitting of it all is that if you admire him moderately, he will get angered because you do not admire him very much, whereas if someone admires him very much, he will get angered as if someone would have flattered him.
To the inescapable malice and insolence of the sole ruler is added inevitable inconsequence. In truth, it will soon become clear that what stands under attack in Otanes' speech are really the worst sides of monarchy. 50 νόμαιά τε κινέει πάτρια καὶ βιᾶται γυναῖκας κτείνει τε ἀκρίτους. (3.80.5) He upsets the ancestral ways and he forces himself on women and he kills indiscriminately.
The worst sides of the sole man's rule is presented as having been concretised in arbitrary killing and in the breaking of ancestral laws. Thus, the argument against monarchy ends. 51 πλῆθος δὲ ἄρχον […] οὔνομα πάντων κάλλιστον ἔχει, ἰσονομίην. (3.80.6).
people's rule […] has the most beautiful name, isonomy.
It is clear that ἰσονομία here does not carry its original (political) sense through direct reference to a constitutional order consisting in some type of broadened elite rule, but functions rather as a watchword designating the supposed fairness and equality of the democratic -or proto-democratic -regime. 52 It may be, or it may be not, that πλῆθος ἄρχον functions as a stand-in for δημοκρατία, which has its earliest occurrence elsewhere in the Histories. 53 All the same, following the argumentation against monarchy, the rule of the many is thrown into the face of the reader as representing, plainly, the best choice for constitution.
Thus, the overview of Otanes' speech in favour of democracy has ended. In terms of internal critique, we may detect a questioning of the premises on which subjects' adherence to the principle of sole rule may be based in Otanes' argumentation against one good man's rule. 54 Indeed, the main effect of Otanes' speech rests on painting such an abominable picture of sole rulers that the rule of one man must be abhorred as a social ordering principle as such. By way of automatically assuming that democracy should take its place, Otanes fails, however, to take into account a third path. This alternative is nevertheless presented directly afterwards by Megabyzus. 51 In fact, already at the beginning of his argumentation Otanes had used an inevitability argument to dismiss the possibility of a properly functioning monarchic regime: κῶς δ᾽ ἂν εἴη χρῆμα κατηρτημένον μουναρχίη, τῇ ἔξεστι ἀνευθύνῳ ποιέειν τὰ βούλεται; ("How could monarchy be a convenient thing, when the monarch can do as he pleases without scrutiny"). 52 Vlastos, "Ἰσονομία πολιτική", [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] For the earliest occurrence of δημοκρατία, see Hdt. 6.43. For the equation of πλῆθος ἄρχον with δημοκρατία, see Asheri, A Commentary on Herodotus Books I-IV, 474. The contrary outlook would be that the Constitutional Debate belongs to an earlier layer of the Histories -one perhaps predating the coining of the term δημοκρατία. See Ehrenberg, "Origins of Demcracy", 526. 54 Cf. f. n. 43 above.
Megabyzus for oligarchy
Ever since Karl Wüst wrote the earliest exposition of the political thought evidenced in Herodotus' Histories in the 1930's, scholars have singled out the narrative rationale of Megabyzus' speech as being that of paving the way -by pointing out the obvious disadvantages of democracy -for the argumentation of Darius in favour of monarchy to follow. 55 Indeed, the overall argumentative content of Megabyzus' speech is quite meagre, as is shown in what follows. ὁμίλου γὰρ ἀχρηίου οὐδέν ἐστι ἀξυνετώτερον οὐδὲ ὑβριστότερον […] ὠθέει τε ἐμπεσὼν τὰ πρήγματα ἄνευ νόου, χειμάρρῳ ποταμῷ ἴκελος. (3.81.1).
Nothing is more void of understanding or more insolent than the no good crowd […] it thrusts and bursts into matters without mind, a winter-flowing river alike.
Megabyzus turns Otanes' accusations away from monarchy and against democracy itself, thus painting a picture of the sovereign people as the most brutal tyrant imaginable: to the insolence and malice of the tyrant, Megabyzus adds the reckless stupidity of the demos. 56 Finally, the absolute heedlessness of the people's rule is emphasised by means of analogy. ἀρίστων δὲ ἀνδρῶν οἰκὸς ἄριστα βουλεύματα γίνεσθαι. (3.81.2).
but it is likely that the best councils come the best men.
Megabyzus closes his speech by assuming what seems to him most reasonable -namely, that in place of the ignorance of the many, the astuteness of the few must be preferred: but from the best men it is likely that the best councils come. This is a simple argument from "likelihood" (εἰκός).
The overview of the speech of Megabyzus -certainly the shortest of the three -did not reveal any clear-cut cases of internal critique. Lacking completely is an argument for the superior justness and efficiency of the oligarchic regime. 57 55 See Wüst, Politisches Denken bei Herodot, 54. Cf. Pelling, "Herodotus' Debate on the Constitutions ", 142. 56 Cf. Bringmann, "Die Verfassungsdebatte bei Herodot", 271. 57 Myers, "La démocratie chez Hérodote", 546.
Darius for monarchy
As noted by many, the main weight of the argumentation employed by Darius lies not so much in pinpointing the disadvantages of the alternative constitutions, as in showing the inevitability of the monarchic regime. 58 However, by looking at the central passages in Darius' speech, it may be detected that therein the arguments combine so that the preceding claims made by the opposing sides are refuted, while the positive argument in favour of monarchy builds upon this disavowal. if the three were to be laid out against each other, and even if all, for the sake of argument, would be the best (of their kind) […] none would show itself better than the rule of the one best man.
τῷ λόγῳ is used here in the sense of 'for the sake of argument' , namely in order to draw a general conclusion from a "hypothetical situation" -something the Greeks had known to do for quite a while when the Constitutional Debate may first have been conceived of. 59 Laid beside each other, monarchy will triumph even over the best form of democracy and oligarchy. This is what Darius claims to be able to prove, and not that the hypothetically best form of monarchy would prevail over its contenders -although the latter is precisely what translators and commentators commonly assume. 60 The mistaken interpretation of Darius' assumption rests on a copu-58 See Pelling, "Herodotus' Debate on the Constitutions", 142. Cf. Allen, "The Origins of Political Philosophy", 86. 59 Lloyd, Polarity and Analogy, 421-423. Actually τῷ λόγῳ is an emendation accepted by most editors based on Stobaeus (4.47.24). The MSS have τῶν λέγω in its place. The emendation, however, must be accepted, since τῶν λέγω fails to make sense with what goes before and after. Other passages in the Histories also bears out the likelihood of a Herodotean use of τῷ λόγῳ in the sense of 'for the sake of argument' . Cf. Hdt. 2.15.1-2, where Herodotus claims to be able to show τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ ("by that argument/theory") of the Egyptians according to which all of Egypt can be reduced to the Delta -that by that argument there was "before no land for the Egyptians" (Αἰγυπτίοισι οὐκ ἐοῦσαν πρότερον χώρην). Furthermore, according to Herdotus, it would by that argument never have been necessary for the Egyptians to try to verify their conception of themselves as the oldest people on earth. Because in fact they had already falsified their own hypothesis by harbouring contradictory beliefs (εἰ τοίνυν σφι χώρη γε μηδεμία ὑπῆρχε, τί περιεργάζοντο δοκέοντες πρῶτοι ἀνθρώπων γεγονέναι; "if there was no land for them, why did they waste so much time and effort on their idea that they had been the first humans?). What we have here is of course a Herodotean example of a reductio ad absurdum. 60 For the usual understanding of Darius' assumption, see Lateiner "The Constitutional Debate", 201: "Otanes and Darius present symmetrically opposite arguments. The former deliberately focuses on the reality of autocracy and the ideal democracy; the latter on the ideal autocracy and the reality of democracy. " Cf. Dewald, lative reading of the particle καί in the passage cited above. However, καί seems not here to be used as a copula, but rather in an enhancing sense -i.e., the particle bears the meaning of 'even (when)' . 61 Actually, Darius' intention is to argue for the superiority of monarchy in all imaginable situations. How he accomplishes it is by picking on the pleas in favour of democracy and oligarchy respectively, and by showing how -through their own arguments -Otanes and Megabyzus actually defeat themselves. In effect, this means that he applies internal critique. Let us see how he manages it. We may recall that Megabyzus had made his plea for oligarchy on the basis that the best men give the best advices, and that therefore these men should rule. This argument is now opposed by Darius with a critique to the effect that while the potentiality to arrive at the best solutions may lies with the best men, these, if they were given the rule, would never co-operate, since they all value their own judgments too highly. Therefore, not proper action, but mutual hatred would be the outcome. ἐξ ὧν στάσιες ἐγγίνονται, ἐκ δὲ τῶν στασίων φόνος: ἐκ δὲ τοῦ φόνου ἀπέβη ἐς μουναρχίην. (3.82.3). from these (hatred) follows dissent, from dissent slaughter, from slaughter follows monarchy. This is Darius' first application of the "μεταβολή theory" -a scheme, with "The Question of Tyranny in Herodotus", 30: "Darius' argument for monarchy is to the point only if one can, anticipating Plato, pick the best human being possible as king". 61 It might be objected here that if Herodotus had sought to avoid confusion about the status of καί he could have used a concessive clause instead -e.g. one beginning with κἂν. This would certainly have been a possibility, but not a necessity. Cf. Homer, Il. 4.161, where καί is also used on its own in an enhancing sense. Another way of making sense of the argument which Herodotus in this passage ascribes to Darius is to read τῷ λόγῳ in the sense of 'in theory' and combine this interpretation with a copulative reading of καί. In this case, the gist of Darius' argument could be rendered as follows: there are three constitutions and each appears to be best 'in theory' -however, only one of them will (in reality) surface as most workable. I am grateful to the reviewer of an earlier draft of this paper for this suggestion. its roots deep in Ionian 6th-century philosophy and formed of the suppositions of necessary passages between states of nature. 62 Here, the theory is applied to show how, by the very nature of things, oligarchy ends up in monarchy. δήμου τε αὖ ἄρχοντος ἀδύνατα μὴ οὐ κακότητα ἐγγίνεσθαι [...] οἱ γὰρ κακοῦντες τὰ κοινὰ συγκύψαντες ποιεῦσι. (3.82.4). then again, when the people rule, it is impossible that wickedness would not find its way in […] since the evil-doers conspire to do more evil.
It cannot be the case, as Otanes had claimed, that people's rule would prevent evil. Evil will occur anyhow. In a democratic government, this would be the consequence of a problem quite the opposite of that, which faces the rule of the few good men -namely, too much co-operation between men who are not good. someone standing before the people […] is admired […] by the people, and being admired is revealed to be a monarch. This is Darius' second application of the μεταβολή theory. According to it, the wicked will continue to conspire until they are stopped by a προστάτης ("one standing before the people"). In the view of Darius, this popular leader turns out to be nothing else than a king.
In the overview of Darius' argumentation, two very similar utilisations of internal critique, each leading up to one of Darius' two invocations of the μεταβολή theory, stand out. Both of these applications represent a type of internal critique, where the argument aspires exposure of counterproductive principles. Megabyzus supported his argumentation in defence of oligarchy with the principle that the judgments of the best men should be paid heed to. Darius counters this, claiming that in the actual reality the men with the best councils fail to meet the standards of the best rule, since if they were to be conjointly in charge they would in fact fail to cooperate. Otanes, in turn, argued against monarchy and for democracy, basing his argumentation on the assumption that if the principle fol-lowed is that of many having a share in the rule, then all of the corruption of the rule of the sole man may be avoided. However, Darius also holds out this principle as being counterproductive. According to him, wickedness and arbitrariness rises among the people when they rule themselves as well. In the end, the internal critique of Darius convinces his companions, and monarchy prevails.
IV: Outcome: the place of the Constitutional Debate in the history of political ideas
Thus, the Constitutional Debate in Book III of the Histories of Herodotus does contain the earliest evidence of the conjoining of internal critique with constitutionalised political thought. The conjoining of normative arguments of an internally critical kind with constitutionalised political thought is particularly evident in the victorious speaker Darius' pleading for monarchy. Here, Darius manages to convince his interlocutors that monarchy should prevail over and against its contender-regimes by means of a demonstration aiming to show how counterproductive the other alternatives would be if they were to be applied as social ordering principles. In contrast, before the breakthrough of democracy (510-460 B.C.E.) the overarching principle of elite rule had been taken for granted throughout the Greek world, and consequently social theorising had been restricted to a form of political thought where different variants of the principle of elite rule were (implicitly or explicitly) compared. 63 Moreover, before the democratic breakthrough the variant social ordering principles had always been intertwined with cosmically naturalising forms of thought, alternatively been understood to be depending on some kind of strong (personal or impersonal) divine authorisation, for their legitimation. With the Constitutional Debate, however, we first encounter a form of social theory in which the different social ordering principles are argumentatively compared in isolation from all forms of cosmically naturalising forms of thought and/or divine authorisations of the human order. Later on in the Greek classical age, the opposing of fundamentally different humanly realisable alternatives for ordering society would finally find its counterpart in forms of political thought envisioning social orders fully transcending all hitherto-conceived-of social alternatives. 64 
